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I. Introduction
Protection of privacy in money affairs, tracing as far back as to ancient
Rome, proves to be not only a long living, but also a much debated, axiom
of law. At present more than twenty per cent of all nations provide secrecy
in banking matters at degrees that keep accounts basically secret from
foreign-and in some cases even from domestic-investigations. Disputes
on the legitimacy of banking secrecy and on conflicts of interest arising
therefrom are inevitable.
The increasing worldwide interpenetration of men and capital and other
developments that pay less and less attention to national boundaries,
apparently aggravate the issue. Some connect tax evasion and capital flight
directly to the existence of banking secrecy, or blame it even as their very
root. Others take a more balanced view and regard shortcomings in the
international tax morality and capital movements as having much broader
aspects. Most critical publicity focuses traditionally on Switzerland. The
questions involved are domestically, as well as in their global context, more
complex than many critics may be aware. And there are valid points on
both sides.
The objective of this study is to review the tax problems connected with
Swiss banking secrecy. To understand the issue, it is indispensably
necessary to know what banking secrecy means in terms of the Swiss legal
and fiscal system. The close affinity between tax information and banking
secrecy makes it also necessary to scrutinize the exchange of information
rules in international tax treaties and to throw a glance at treaties on
mutual assistance in criminal matters. Since protection of privacy in bank-
ing matters has come under particularly vigorous attack from the United
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States, emphasis will be laid on the Swiss-United States tax relationships.
However, the underlying problems and the assessment of the situation
refer- mutatis mutandis-to other countries as well.
II. Banking Secrecy in Switzerland
A. Survey
Swiss law assigns a high priority to the sanctity of the individual and his
personal rights. The sphere of privacy (Geheimsphaere) is recognized as an
integral part of the personal rights of each individual. It includes his
intellectual existence (geistiges Sein), health, family life and financial
affairs.1 Privacy is an enforceable right by virtue of Article 28 of the Civil
Code and Articles 41 and 49 of the Code of Obligations.
A person wrongfully injured in his personal privacy may sue for in-
junction and, in certain cases, for damages. In the field of banking, the
banker's obligation to observe the client's privacy, by keeping secret his
financial status and money transactions, is in addition being regarded as an
essential contractual element (duty of loyalty) under the law of agency2 the
violation of which may make the agent liable.3 These time-honored prin-
ciples of private law are the fundamentals of Swiss banking secrecy.
The broad scope of personal rights-normally extended also to aliens
residing in Switzerland-merits particular legal protection in a country
whose geographical position, tradition of neutrality and political stability
made it for centuries a refugium for politically, religiously and racially
persecuted people. It is not so long ago when Nazi agents on their ruthless
drive to seize private assets of German Jews, attempted by all means to
gain access to the identity of Jewish depositors in Swiss banks and thereby
grossly violated the public order and sovereignty of Switzerland. The Swiss
government deemed it necessary to curb such illegal activities of foreign
powers, by supplementing the civil law liability for violating banking secre-
cy with the criminal offense under provisions of the public law. The
intelligence game of foreign agents spying for banking information thus
became a little more risky. 4
'See Egger, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch, 2d ed., Zurich, 1930, art.
26. The sphere of privacy is also extended to the 'economic personality'. For an outline in
English see Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage, 23 JEo. WASH. L. RI v.
287 (1955).2Art. 394 et seq. of the Code of Obligations.
31d. art. 97.
4That the penal protection of privacy in banking affairs has not become obsolete, is
shown in a recent case in which a diplomat of the British Embassy in Switzerland and a senior
officer of the British Treasury, successfully bribed two employees of a Geneva bank to
disclose names and other data as to allegedly British depositors. See Neue Zuercher Zeitung
(Fernausgabe), March 12, 1972, at 20.
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B. Swiss Banking Law
Current legislation on monetary and banking is based on the Con-
stitutiorn of the Swiss Confederation. 5 The Federal Law relating to Banks
and Saiings Banks of November 8, 1934, as amended (hereinafter cited as
"Banking Law"),6 is one of the most important legislative acts in this area.
It is the expression of a liberal economic policy, contains traditional prin-
ciples of banking operations and binds all banks, private bankers, savings
banks and financial institutions who publicly solicit deposits. Supervision
of banks is exercised by the Federal Banking Commission whose members
are appointed by the Swiss Federal Council. 7
The main objective of the Banking Law is the protection of the depositor
and other bank creditors. An essential part of the safeguards is found in
Article 47 in that it makes violations of the confidential relations between
the banker and his clientele punishable.
C. Scope ofArticle 47 of the Banking Law
Article 47 was amended in 19708 and deals now exclusively with the
violationof banking secrecy. The provision reads as follows:9
I. Whosoever discloses a secrecy that has been entrusted to him or of
which he has received knowledge in his capacity as official, employee, agent,
liquidator or commissioner of a bank, as observer of the banking commission,
as official or employee of a recognized auditing firm, or whosoever attempts
to induce somebody else to commit such a violation of the professional
secrecy, shall be punished with imprisonment up to 6 months or with a fine up
to 50,000 francs.
2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall be a fine
up to 30,000 francs.
3. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable beyond the
termination of the official or professional relationship, or the exercise of the
profession.
4. Excepted are Federal and cantonal provisions concerning the duty to
testify and the duty to present information to an official.
Violation of banking secrecy is an ex officio offense (Offizialdelikt),
which means that the injured party does not have to file a request for
prosecution, thus emphasizing the public interest in the punishment of such
offenders or, in other words, the assurance of the government in protecting
5Art. 31 quater, 38 and 39.6Amtliche Sammlung der Bundesgesetze und Verordnungen (Official Collection of Fed-
eral Laws and Regulations (hereinafter cited as "AS") 197 1, at 808. For an unofficial English
translation of the Banking Law (as in force in 1968) see "Swiss Federal Banking Law,"
published by the Union Bank of Switzerland, Zurich, 1968.7The Federal Council (Bundesrat) is the highest executive authority in Switzerland.
8AS 1971, at 808.
9Translated by the author.
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the individual's privacy. The negligent disclosing of banking information is,
in line with that policy, also punishable. A further significant feature is
subjection to the punishment of even an unsuccessful attempt to induce
somebody else to disclose secret data-a device designed to protect bank
officials from third person's attempts and pressures to supply information.10
The 1970 amendment extends the personal scope of Article 47 to some
additional persons, whereby members and officials of the Banking Commis-
sion are now subjected to the more severe penalties of the Penal Code."
The new paragraph 3 now makes it clear that violation of banking secrecy
remains punishable beyond the date on which the offender terminates his
official position or resigns from the exercise of his professional activity.
Article 47 was finally supplemented by a clause determining that banking
secrecy is subject to Federal or cantonal provisions relating to the duty to
testify by a witness, and the duty to supply information to an official.
That clarification may be regarded as a legislative effort to do away with
the widespread legend that banking secrecy enjoys an absolute legal pro-
tection. Swiss legal doctrine1 2 and practice 13 have always maintained the
view that in certain cases other legal provisions take precedence over
banking secrecy. Violations of Article 47 are investigated by the cantonal
criminal prosecution authorities, and punished by the ordinary cantonal
courts.14
In this context it is necessary to recall also Article 273 of the Penal
Code on economic espionage (Wirtschaftlicher Nachrichtendienst) making
punishable a person who discloses information considered a business se-
cret to a foreign source.' 5 The Federal Court has repeatedly confirmed that
this provision includes the offence of directing information to foreign fiscal
or currency authorities.' 6 Finally, Article 162 of the Penal Code is to be
1 0The successful attempt is punishable in connection with art. 24(l) of the Penal Code.
"Art. 320.
12See, among many authors, Maurice Aubert, Berufsgeheimnis des Bankiers, Separat-
druck aus Schweizerische Juristische Kartothek, 1970, with an index of other literature on the
topic.
'
3 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes (Decisions of the Swiss Federal
Court (hereinafter cited as "BGE") 95 (1969) 1444.14Most other offenses against the Banking Law are dealt with administratively by the
Federal Department of Finance and Customs. See art. 51 bis.
15Art. 273 reads as follows:
A person who, through searching, secures a manufacturing or business secret, in order
to make it accessible to a foreign official agency, or to a foreign organization, or to a
private business enterprise, or to their agents, a person who makes accessible a manufac-
turing or business secret to a foreign official agency, or to a foreign organization, or to a
private business enterprise, or to their agents, shall be punished by imprisonment, in
serious cases in the penitentiary. In addition a fine may be imposed. (Translation
according to Meyer, supra n. I, at 302).
1
6 BGE 74 (1948) IV 102.
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mentioned, dealing with-only upon complaint (Antragsdelikt)-the offence
of revealing a business secret which had to be guarded under a legal or
contractual obligation. 17
To sum up, Article 47 of the Banking Law does not determine the
substantive scope of banking secrecy. The obligation to observe secrecy
existed in Swiss law long before the enactment of that widely cited provi-
sion. 18 Nor does Article 47 indicate when secrecy will be superseded by
overriding rules. The answer on this essential question can only be derived
from various Federal and cantonal laws.' 9 The following section reviews
briefly some significant areas in which banking secrecy might be overruled
by other legal provisions. The position of banking secrecy in the Swiss tax
system will, however, be analyzed more thoroughly in the following chap-
ter.
D. Limitations on Banking Secrecy
Contrary to a widespread belief numerous cases exist where Federal
and cantonal laws take precedence over the Federal rule on banking
secrecy. Such limitations are based on various procedural provisions on
both legislative levels as well as on Federal substantive laws.
To testify in trial proceedings is a public duty and can for this reason not
be avoided by referring to a contractual agreement to secrecy. Only provi-
sions of the public law can provide exceptions therefrom. The Federal
"
7Art. 162 (Verleizung des FabriAations-oder Geschaeftsgeheimnisses) reads as fol-
lows"
A person who reveals a manufacturing or business secret with regard to which he was
under a duty to observe secrecy because of a duty imposed by law or assumed by
contract, a person who takes advantage of such a disclosure, shall be punished by
imprisonment or fine in case complaint has been made by the injured party. (Translation
according to Meyer, supra n. 1, at 303 n.68).181t is therefore inaccurate to speak of so-called Swiss "secrecy laws," a term frequently
used in Anglo-American countries to designate mysterious (and actually non-existing) laws on
banking secrecy. The confidentiality between the banker and his client is based-as various
other confidential relationships-on provisions of private law as discussed above. With art. 47
a rule of public law merely reinforced the already existing protection.
19How much easier is it to interpret an 'untraditional' law on banking secrecy as
introduced in various countries in the last decade! Thus the Lebanese Banking Secrecy Law
of September 3, 1956, leaves no doubt on its quasi-absolute scope:
Managers and employees of the banking establishments referred to in the first article
as well as persons who are acquainted through their quality or their function, by one
means or another, with bank books, operations and banking correspondence, are bound
to absolute secrecy, in favour of the bank's clients, and cannot disclose to anyone
whatsoever, private individual or an administrative, military or judicial authority, clients'
names, their assets and facts of which they are aware, except with the client's written
authorization of his heirs' or his legatees,' or in case he should be declared bankrupt, or
in the event of a dispute between the client and the bank resulting from banking relations.
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Code of Criminal Procedure2 ' does not extend to the banker the right to
refuse to testify or produce documents in criminal investigations or pro-
ceedings as it does with regard to clergymen, attorneys, notaries, physi-
cians, pharmacists, midwives and their professional assistants. 21 The bank-
er therefore cannot refuse to comply with such procedural provisions in
cases where facts covered by banking secrecy come into play.
Similarly the Federal Code of Civil Procedure22 authorizes only persons
enumerated in Article 321 of the Penal Code to refuse to testify, and these
only to the extent that facts to be disclosed are professional secrets within
the meaning of that provision. 23 The banker does not belong to those
privileged persons. However, the judge may waive the obligation to dis-
close a professional secret if the interests of an involved person for not
disclosing it outweigh other interests.
At variance from the two Federal judicial procedural codes the Federal
Law on Administrative Procedure,24 as applied in administrative proce-
dures, grants to the holder of a professional or business secret the right to
deny testimony to the extent that an obligation to testify is not expressly
imposed on him by another Federal Law. 25 Such a duty may for instance,
for bankers, be established in some fiscal proceedings which are conducted
under the rules of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure. But in most
administrative procedures the banker will be exempted from testifying by
virtue of his capacity as holder of a professional secret.
Of more practical importance are the cantonal procedural laws under
which the overwhelming majority of criminal and civil trials are held.2 6 The
hierarchy of the different levels of law provides the maxim of the over-
riding force of Federal law over inconsistent cantonal law. 27 However, the
Federal Constitution reserves to the cantons the right to legislate on court
procedures. 28 Legal doctrine and practice in Switzerland generally recog-
nize that Article 47 of the Banking Law was not intended to impose any
restrictions, on the power of the cantons to promulgate their civil and
20Bundesgesetz ueber die Bundesstrafrechtspflege vom 15. Juni, 1934 (BS 3, at
303)-THi FEDERAL COOiLs OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEDURE determine the procedures
before the Federal Court (which is comparable to the United States Supreme Court). This
Court exercises mainly appellate jurisdiction over decisions of cantonal tribunals.2 1Art. 77.
2 2 Bundesgesetz ueber den Bundeszivilprozess vom 4. Dezember, 1947 (AS 1948, at 485).23Art. 42.24Bundesgesetz ueber das Verwaltungsverfahren (AS 1969, at 737).25Art. 16.26There exist twenty-five cantonal jurisdictions. Each canton has its own criminal and
civil procedural laws.27Art. 2 of the Interim Regulations of the Federal Constitution.28Arts. 64 and 64 bis.
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criminal procedural codes. To this extent, cantonal procedural laws take
precedence over banking secrecy.29
Like the Federal Code, the majority of the cantonal codes of criminal
procedure do not exempt the banker from the obligation to testify, or to
comply with other procedural measures such as opening books to in-
spection. Only two cantons have provided that the holder of a professional
secret may refuse testimony in criminal matters.0 °The cantonal codes of
civil procedure are less uniform with respect to the obligation of testimony.
Most cantons, however, include in the group of persons entitled to refuse
testifying on the ground of professional secrecy, only clergymen, lawyers
and physicians. Bankers would principally be obliged to testify in those
cantons.
Some of the procedural codes contain special provisions concerning
business secrets, with the effect of leaving it to the discretion of the court
to exempt someone from giving evidence.3 1 Other cantons fix a general
right to refuse to testify with respect to professional secrets without listing
the privileged persons. Bankers probably do not have to testify in those
jurisdictions. In addition to the outlined procedural limitations, there are
various instances in the substantive law in which banking secrecy is super-
seded by other norms.3 2
With regard to inheritance laws the principle of direct succession (Uni-
versalsukzession) prevails, which means that all rights of the deceased
person pass to the heirs. A bank must therefore disclose information with
respect to the estate to the heirs, the agent representing the estate, the
executor and the official administrator winding up the estate.33 Essential
limitations on banking secrecy are further imposed in proceedings for the
enforcement of debts. A debtor cannot hide his assets in bank accounts
under the veil of secrecy? 4
One area, however, remains controversial. Swiss law allows, under cer-
tain conditions, the securing of a debt by means of an attachment (arrest)
even in cases where the creditor cannot specify the debtor's assets. There
are strong arguments against a duty to disclose banking secrecy in such
cases, since that device-easily available-could be abused for the purpose
of merely obtaining knowledge of another person's assets, and thus to
circumvent banking secrecy.
29BGE 95 (1969) I 439.30Cantons of Vaud and Neuchatel.31For instance, Zuerich Code of Civil Procedure, para. 188.
32 For a survey see Aubert, supra note 12; Meyer, supra note I, at 293; Mueller, The
Swiss Banking Secret, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 360 (1969).3 BGE 89 (1963) 1193.
34 BGE 86 (1960) 111 114.
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E. Numbered Accounts
Widespread misconceptions prevail with reference to so-called "secret
accounts" or "numbered accounts" in Swiss banks.35 It must be reempha-
sized that there is no legal difference between ordinary and numbered bank
accounts. The numbered account, labelled by a code number instead of by
the name of the holder, is simply an internal device of the banker to
provide a more efficient protection of confidentiality with regard to in-
fringements by subordinated employees. The identity of such accounts
remains restricted to a few senior bank officials. 36 Both types of accounts
enjoy the same legal secrecy protection (there exists no legal "superdiscre-
tion"), and both of them are subject to the very same limitations of law.
Tax and criminal prosecution authorities deal with numbered and ordinary
accounts in exactly the same way.
III. Swiss Tax System and Banking Secrecy
A. Tax Assessment and Availability of Information
The multitude of Federal and cantonal tax laws have one common
feature: the Swiss tax authorities must primarily rely on the assessment
data provided by the taxpayer himself. This approach is based on the
sound assumption that the taxpayer knows his financial status best. By
filing the tax return he sets in motion the process of determining his tax
liability. If the assessment seems to be insufficient or understated, the
revenue service may request him to appear for a personal interrogation or
to submit evidence such as banking documents, contracts, salary certifi-
cates.
A legal obligation of third parties to supply information in assessment
proceedings does generally not exist except in a few cases where it is
regarded as an absolute necessity and only to the extent that the tax law
provides it explicitly. 37 The assessment of taxes constitutes an adminis-
trative procedure, for which no general obligation of a citizen to give
testimony exists, nor need he make a statement or produce a document or
article of evidence as it prevails under judicial procedural rules.
35The establishment of numbered accounts is by no means a privilege of Swiss banks.
The Government of Singapore, for instance, also introduced the system of numbered accounts
when revising its banking regulations in 1970. See The Straits Times, August 1, 1970.36According to one estimate, numbered accounts make up only about 3 to 4 per cent of
all accounts and the amounts involved are less than 10 percent of total deposits. U.S. NEws
AND WORLD REPORT, Feb. 21, 1972, at 61.37For instance, with respect to partnerships to determine the income of each partner, or
employers to issue salary certificates, or a debtor to certify the amount of indebtedness. For
Federal income tax see Federal Defense Tax Act (Wehrsteuerbeschluss), art. 90.
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As a corollary the tax authorities have a wide range of discretionary
powers. They evaluate submitted information and evidence freely. Even
where tax laws require the cooperation of third parties, it is usually up to
the taxpayer to collect the information. The Swiss legislators thus empha-
size the system of self-assessment, by being very reluctant to concede to
the tax authorities, the competence to apply directly to the source of
information.
Under that concept it is obvious that the tax authorities have no basis to
obtain assessment data directly from banks. If a client authorizes his bank
to provide the revenue service with the demanded information, then a bank
may not refuse to supply it, since secrecy is a right only of the client and
not of the bank.3 8 The principle of non-availability of tax information from
third parties, extends also to proceedings in which the bank itself is tax-
payer. Knowledge of a person's financial status obtained when auditing the
books of a bank may not be used for the assessment of that person. The
Federal Anticipatory Tax Law provides explicitly that banking secrecy has
to be observed in such cases. 39
These assessment rules apply basically also on proceedings of tax ap-
peals. This is of particular significance when a judicial authority is dealing
with an appeal. The court then relies generally on the administrative rules
as set forth in the tax law-at variance from non-tax trials at which the
citizen's general duty to give testimony prevails. 40 However, any tax sys-
tem requires some efficient weapons to make unwilling taxpayers comply.
The Swiss tax authorities can put pressure on a taxpayer suspected of
underreporting his revenues by means of an official estimate of his tax
liability (Ermessenstaxation). It means a careful ex officio determination of
income and property under due consideration of all circumstances. The
official estimate device may in certain causes be combined with the with-
drawal of the right to appeal and with a penalty for tax evasion.
41
Experience shows that the Swiss system of self-assessment with its
effective means of determining the tax liability of non-complying persons
works satisfactorily. Of course, like any system, it cannot completely
3 8BGE 74 (1948)l 492.
39Art. 40(5). Fora case on the cantonal level see BGE 64 (1938) 1 187.40See Ernst Blumenstein, System des Steuerrechts, 3d ed., Zurich, 1971, at 419 et seq.
However, the judicial procedure provisions are applicable in criminal tax fraud trials.41There exist some additional safeguards to prevent abuses of this liberal assessment
system. A considerable degree of control may be exercised by using data obtained from tax
returns of other taxpayers (except banks), and a cooperation to that end between the various
tax authorities on all levels. Further, capital income, such as dividends and interest (derived
from Swiss sources), are burdened with a relatively high withholding tax of thirty percent
(equalling roughly the highest tax brackets), refundable only upon reporting the income item.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 1
Banking Secrecy in Swiss and International Taxation
eliminate tax evasion. But it leaves the citizens' privacy in financial matters
to a fair extent untouched, and makes it unnecessary to burden third
parties with informative obligations which would widely be regarded as not
appropriate.
B. Tax Offenses and Banking Secrecy
Swiss tax authorities have no direct access to bank information in the
assessment procedure. The crucial answer whether banking secrecy must
be lifted in investigations for tax offenses is a very complex issue and
cannot be immediately derived from the tax laws.
Federal and cantonal tax laws are not uniform with respect to the
terminology of tax offenses. They use various terms for violations of tax
provisions. The patterns of proceedings to investigate and punish tax
offenses also vary greatly. But most tax laws draw a distinction roughly
between mere evasion of taxes by non-reporting of income or property, and
more severe cases in which the means to evade taxes have distinctive
fraudulent characteristics, be it through deceiving the tax authorities by
deliberately using incorrect, falsified or untrue balance sheets, financial
statements, inventories and other documents of evidentiary value, or be it
through concealing documents containing tax-relevant evidence or by using
other fraudulent means. 42
The line between the two groups varies from canton to canton and there
is also no uniformity in the Federal tax laws. 43 For purposes of this study
the offense of mere non-reporting will be referred to as tax evasion (Steuer-
hinterziehung) and the qualified form with fraudulent traits as tax fraud
(Steuerbetrug).
The offense of tax evasion is regularly subjected to fines only, often
determined as a multiple of the tax deficiency. Persons convicted of tax
fraud are under most tax laws punishable either by fines or by imprison-
ment, or both. The rationale for this differentiated penal treatment for the
two kinds of tax offenses must evidently be sought in an attitude consid-
ering tax fraud-that has close similarities to the severely punishable com-
mon crime of fraud-as having a much higher degree of moral turpitude
and social harm than mere tax evasion.44
42Compare Decision of the Federal Court of March 16, 195 1, published in Archiv fuer
Schweizerisches Abgaberecht, vol. 20, at 9 1.43The Federal Defense Tax Act uses only the term "tax evasion," which also includes
the forms of fraudulent violations (Art. 129). The Federal Anticipatory Tax Law clearly
differentiates between the terms "tax evasion" and "tax fraud" (Art. 61).
44Notwithstanding an inner relationship between common fraud and tax fraud the latter is
not punishable under the Penal Code because of the autonomous position of the tax laws
within the Swiss legal system (compare arts. 333 and 335(2) of the Penal Code).
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The distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud may become the
decisive factor for the availability of bank information. Tax evasion, not
considered as a crime in terms of the Penal Code, is dealt with in an
administrative procedure by the tax authorities. In line with the assessment
rules, bankers as well as other third persons may then not be required to
furnish information.
Tax fraud, on the other hand, may be prosecuted by two different
procedures, depending on the pattern of the applicable tax law. Under one
group it remains an administrative procedure identical to that applicable on
tax evasion. Third-party (including bank) information is then not obtain-
able. This group includes the Federal income tax (Defense Tax), assessed
and collected by the cantons under supervision of the Confederation 45 and,
among others, the income and net wealth tax in the Canton of Berne
(therefore often referred to as "Berne group"). A second group of tax laws
goes a wholly different way and transfers the investigation of tax fraud
cases to the ordinary prosecution authorities and the punishment to the
criminal courts (this group is sometimes referred to as "Zurich group").46
This pattern of prosecuting tax fraud is much more severe in that the
proceedings are no more conducted under the provisions of the tax law but
under the rules of the criminal procedure code. As already pointed out,
most procedural codes do not exempt the banker from the duty of furnish-
ing information, to give testimony or to produce documents. Hence banking
secrecy may in such cases be superseded by procedural duty. The tougher ap-
proach fits into the widely held view that puts tax fraud at an equal adverse
standing as other criminal delicts, warranting the application of the same
rigid procedural rules. 4
7
IV. International Treaties and Banking Secrecy
A. Tax Treaties
I. OECD DRAFT CONVENTION
The application of a tax treaty implies an appropriate cooperation be-
tween the tax administration of the contracting countries. Facts on which
the domestic tax laws and treaty rules are to be applied must in many cases
be ascertained bilaterally. The OECD Draft Convention of 1963 includes
45 Federal Defense Tax Act, art. 129.46That group includes, among others, the cantons with the major banking centers: Zurich,
Basel-City and Geneva.
47See P. Lavanchy, Das Bankgeheimnis in der Schweizerischen Gesetzgebung mit be-
sonderer Beruecksichtigung des Steuerrechts, Thesis, Zurich 1935, at 23. Compare also BG E
96 (1970) 1 737.
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in Article 26 a provision pertaining to the exchange of information. 48
Information necessary for tne carrying out of the treaty, and of the domes-
tic laws (to the extent that the taxes concerned are covered by the treaty) is
exchangeable. Apart from the furnishing of routine information, assistance
will be requested in cases where the information obtained from the regu-
larly available sources, is not sufficient or is in need of confirmation.
However, the OECD formula is subject to some essential limitations. 49
One stipulates that the requested country is not bound to carry out admin-
istrative measures going beyond its own domestic laws. Obviously, tax
secrecy may not constitute an obstacle for the exchange of information.
Supplied information must be treated as secret and not be disclosed. The
information clause may, on the other hand, not be construed to oblige
supplying particulars which are not available under the laws, or in the
normal course of the administration of the requested country. Thus, data
already in the files of the tax authorities, or available in the normal proce-
dure of assessment, are obtainable.
There exists no obligation to undertake investigations of the taxpayer's
or other persons' books. A last restriction pertains to the disclosure of
certain secret data. Information which would disclose any trade, business,
industrial, commercial or professional or trade process secrecy as well as
those which would be contrary to public policy are excluded. The OECD
commentary mentions further dispensations-for example "information
protected by provisions on banker's discretion."' 50 This approach does not
substantially vary from the Swiss policy in this field.
B. SWISS TAX TREATIES
Switzerland has traditionally observed a prudent reluctance in the area
of international exchange of fiscal information. This attitude reflects bas-
ically the information pattern prevailing in the domestic tax system with its
primary reliance on the taxpayer as source for assessment data. It might
further have to be linked with attempts of some governments to abuse
fiscal information for non-tax purposes, such as supervision of international
capital movements or currency control. 51 However, Switzerland has not
48See commentary on art. 26, OECD document C(63)87.4 9Para. 2 of art. 26.
5 Commentary on art. 26, No. 13. This interpretation is confirmed by criticism of some
members of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and Devel-
oping Countries expressed on art. 26 at its 1970 Geneva meeting. They suggested extension
of the scope of the information clause in order to eliminate "avenues of tax avoidance due to
the secrecy of bank-accounts." See U.N. publication E/4936, ST/ECA/137, at 19.
51See Locher, Handbuch und Praxis der schweizerisch-amerikani-schen Doppelbesteue-
rungsabkommen, Einkommens- und Erbschafts-steuern (Handbook and Practice of the
Swiss-American Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Income and Estates
and Inheritance Taxes) (hereinafter cited as "Locher"), vol. 1, No. 185.
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been sitting back, but curtailed unilaterally tax-free evasion schemes
through the use of Swiss banking accounts.
52
Among the tax treaties concluded by Switzerland, only four of them
include an information provision. 53 The clause in the treaties with the
United Kingdom, France and Germany are nearly identical, with the ex-
ception that the treaty with the United Kingdom does not explicitly list the
banking secrecy as nonexchangeable information. 54 But the ommission
does not have any practical significance since business and professional
secrecy also covers banking data. The information provision in the
Swiss-United States Treaty provides in addition for the exchange of in-
formation "for the prevention of fraud." The scope of this formula and its
particular impact on banking secrecy calls for a particular analysis.
55
But it is important to point out within this context, that even without an
exchange of information clause Switzerland provides all treaty partners
routinely or, in particular cases, upon request, with any information that is
necessary for the correct treaty application and for the prevention of
abuses of treaty benefits.56 It considers the provisions on the mutual
agreement procedure and on the reduction of taxes withheld at the source
or similar clauses as an appropriate basis for the exchange of information.
5 7
52The withholding tax of thirty percent on capital income (dividends, interest, etc.) from
Swiss sources is a final tax burden to non-residents, unless relief is granted in a tax treaty with
the payee's country, and only to the extent that such income is reported to the revenue service
of the residence country. With respect to income for non-Swiss sources it is clear that benefits
from tax treaties between Switzerland and third countries may not be claimed by persons,
who are not residing in Switzerland and not reporting the respective income item.53United States of America (1951), art. XVI; United Kingdom (1954/1966), art. XX;
France (1966), art. 28; Germany (1971), art. 27.54Art. 28 of the Swiss-French Tax Treaty reads as follows:
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States may exchange on appli-
cation such information (being information which is available under their respective
taxation laws in the normal course of administration) as is necessary for the carrying out
of this Convention. Any information so exchanged shall be treated as secret and shall not
be disclosed to any person other than those concerned with the assessment or collection
of the taxes which are the subject of this Convention. No information shall be exchanged
which would disclose any trade, banking, industrial or professional secret or any trade
process.
2. In no case shall the provisions of this Article be construed so as to impose on
one of the Contracting States the obligation to carry out administrative measures at
variance with its regulations and practice or which would be contrary to the sovereignty,
security, public policy or general interest of its own State or to supply particulars which
are not procurable under the legislation of its own State or the State making such
application.55See infra, ch. 5.
56A case decided under the 1948 Swiss-Swedish Tax Treaty (with no provision on
exchange of information), evidences that Switzerland gives a fairly wide interpretation to the
(in casu) unwritten obligation to prevent abuses of treaty benefits by means of furnishing
information upon request to the treaty partner. See 72 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt fuer
Staats- und Gemeindeverwaltung, 178 (197 I).57Switzerland entered out of these considerations a reservation on art. 26 of the OECD
Draft Convention. See commentary on art. 26, No. 14.
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The inclusion of an explicit clause in the treaties with the three men-
tioned countries may, therefore, be regarded as little more than a declarato-
ry and psychological concession taking into consideration bargaining as-
pects and peculiarities in the tax relationships with those treaty partners.
However, information protected by banking secrecy is-in line with the
OECD Draft Convention provisions-in either case for the reasons al-
ready explained not obtainable.
B. Treaties on Mutual Assistance
Switzerland concluded treaties on mutual assistance in civil and criminal
mattersP8 with a number of countries. It also ratified the European Con-
vention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of April 20, 1959Ps
None of those treaties rule on particulars with respect to procedural mat-
ters. A Federal law on mutual assistance does not exist,6 0 and the Federal
Law of Extradition of 189261 is silent on the matter. The providing of
judicial assistance remains therefore within the realm of the cantonal legis-
lation. Hence, cantonal procedural provisions determine the availability
and the extent of assistance and information. The same applies to the duty
to disclose information shielded by banking secrecy 2
All treaties on mutual assistance in criminal matters concluded so far by
Switzerland, exclude investigations or proceedings concerning violations
with respect to fiscal laws. The Federal Law on Extradition also provides
for an exclusion clause 3 The non-availability of mutual assistance in fiscal
matters pertains also to violations of tax laws which are prosecuted like
criminal acts under applicable cantonal procedural law such as tax fraud.6 4
Banking information is therefore internationally not obtainable in criminal
cases to the extent that they relate to tax offenses 5
This policy is by no means confined to mutual assistance treaties to
which Switzerland is a treaty party, but it reflects a still prevailing in-
ternational standard. The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters of 1957 similarly includes a provision, by which assist-
SSFor the publication of the treaties see Bereinigte Sammlung der Bundesgesetze und
Verordnungen, 1848- 1947 (Revised Collection of Federal Laws and Regulations
1848-1947), (hereinafter cited as "BS") 12, at 59 et seq,59AS 1967, at 831.
60A Federal law on mutual assistance in criminal matters is in the stage of preparation
and may be enacted in the future.
6 1BS 12, at 267.62For a case of international mutual assistance in criminal matters, between Switzerland
and Austria, in which information covered by banking secrecy was disclosed, see Blaetterfuer
Zuercherische Rechisprechung, vol. 36, No. 108. For a summary of that decision in English
see Meyer, supra note 1, at 327 n. 125.
63Art. 1I. See also BGE 74 (1948) IV 104.
64See supra, ch. 3.
6 5For an exception from this rule under the Swiss U.S. tax treaty see infra, ch. 5.
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ance may be refused in a case of a fiscal offense. 66 It remains obviously a
matter of fact that most countries remain sensitive in this area and are not
willing to afford other nations substantial support and cooperation in en-
forcing foreign tax laws and fiscal claims.
Though not falling strictly within the terms of mutual assistance, another
approach available to foreign countries to get access to confidential in-
formation in non-fiscal cases is worth mentioning here for the sake of
comprehensiveness of this survey. If a country is civilly injured by an
illegal act which was committed against it which also constitutes a crime
under Swiss law, the foreign country might be accorded the status of an
"in jured party"-not as a public body but as a quasi private person-within
the meaning of the applicable cantonal procedural code. The party rights
under the code are then similarly extended to the injured foreign country,
however, subject to certain conditions. Banking secrecy will then be super-
seded by the cantonal procedural rules unless they privilege a banker. 67
The Federal Court recently confirmed the availability of the injured
party status to a foreign state.6 8 Two American citizens defrauded the U.S.
Government on contracts to supply war material by issuing fictitious in-
voices for several million dollars, and by depositing the embezzled funds in
a Swiss Bank. Upon application of the United States the Zurich District
Prosecutor granted the United States the status of an injured party and
therewith the right to inspect files including bank documents, but only after
submitting a formal declaration, that the information so obtained would not
be used for fiscal purposes in the United States.
Significant in this context is the argument of the Court that there is "no
reason to treat a public body otherwise and worse than a private person, if,
as a result of transactions under civil law the community has been directly
injured by a criminal act." 69 Foreign countries may by nature have relative-
ly few opportunities to obtain the injured party status. Nevertheless, this
approach is entirely consistent with established Swiss legal rules, and the
decision in no way constitutes a 'landmark case.' 70
66Art. 2(a). Also the European Convention on Extradition is applicable on fiscal offenses
only "if the Contracting Parties have so decided in respect of any such offense or category of
offense" (Art. 5).6 7See supra, ch. 3.68BGE 95 (1969)1 439 and 451. A slightly divergent version of one of the decisions was
published in English in 9 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 567 (1970). However, under
the misleading title "Swiss Court Decision Concerning Obligation of Banks to Furnish
Information in Tax Fraud Proceedings." For comments on the decision in the U.S. see:
L.A.R., Swiss Banks and the Avoidance of American Tax and Securities Laws-An Assess-
ment Based on Proposed Legislation, 3 N.Y. U. JOURNAL OF INT'L L. & POL. 94 (1970); von
Tuerk, Banking Secrecy, 12 HARV. INT'L L. J. 579 (1971).
699 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 574 (1970).
7
"'Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1970, at 9.
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V. Swiss-United States Tax Treaty and Banking Secrecy
A. Tax Treaty Information Clause
1. SCOPE OF ARTICLE XVI
The Swiss-United States Tax Treaty contains an information clause,
with a scope covering not only information necessary for carrying out
treaty provisions, but also for the prevention of tax fraud. It follows the
standard pattern of most United States tax treaties. 71 Since the wide reach
of the information provision is not consistent with the long-standing Swiss
policy in this treaty area, it must be assumed that the United States
regarded it as a conditio sine qua non for the conclusion of the agree-
ment. 72 The painstaking interpretative history of the "fraud" clause with
the still prevailing difficulty of fitting it into two different tax and legal
systems, raises serious doubts whether its draftsmen had grasped the
complexities of the formula.
Article XVI(l) and (3) provide:
1. The competent authorities of the contracting States shall exchange such
information (being information available under the respective taxation laws of
the contracting States) as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the
present convention, or for the prevention of fraud or the like in relation to the
taxes which are the subject of the present Convention. Any information so
exchanged shall be treated as secret and shall not be disclosed to any person
other than those concerned with the assessment and collection of the taxes
which are the subject of the present Convention. No information shall be
exchanged which would disclose any trade, business, industrial or profes-
sional secret or any trade process.
2. ...
3. In no case shall the provisions of this Article be construed so as to
impose upon either of the contracting States the obligation to carry out
administrative measures at variance with the regulations and practice of
either contracting State or which would be contrary to its sovereignty secu-
rity or public policy or to supply particulars which are not procurable under
its own legislation or that of the State making application.
The application of that part pertaining to the exchange of information
"necessary for carrying out the provisions" of the Treaty did not pose
particular problems. Its main purpose is to give to the other country
information on taxpayers claiming an exemption or deduction from taxes
under the Treaty in order to prevent the abuse of treaty provisions and to
secure the taxation of treaty-favored income.73 The question of disclosing
-
1For an outline on information clauses in U.S. tax treaties, see Mitchell B. Carroll,
Evolution of U.S. Treaties to Avoid Double Taxation of Income, pt. II, 3 INT'L LAW. 163
(1968).72Locher, vol. 2, art. XVI, No. 9.73Locher, vol. 1, No. 190.
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information under banking secrecy does not arise here because treaty
advantages benefit the taxpayer only to the extent that he supplies the
demanded data with respect to his capital investments in stocks, bonds,
bank deposits, etc. 74
Very few precedents deal with the interpretation of the crucial "pre-
vention of fraud" clause.75 Until the recent, hereinafter discussed decision
of the Federal Court no Swiss judicial authority has ever knowingly ruled
on that area of Article XVI. Some conclusions could, however, be drawn
from some related Treaty provisions, and a few published rulings of admin-
istrative authorities.
The obligation to furnish information pertains only to offenses with
regard to taxes covered by the Treaty, 76 and the term "fraud" must be
interpreted under the law of the requested country. 77 Notwithstanding the
restrictive wording, it appears to be obvious that the "fraud" clause applies
not only to preventive, but also to repressive measures. It is difficult to
mark a borderline between prevention and suppression in the field of
taxation, and the provision would otherwise become meaningless to a large
extent, for the tax authorities are often not in a position to prevent tax
fraud. 7 8
The two requirements need not be fulfilled cumulatively: in other words,
information to prevent or suppress fraud need not also be related to a case
of double taxation. Further it is not required that the person on whom
information is demanded be taxable in both countries or that he be sus-
pected of an illegal tax offense. 79 Not available is information which would
disclose any trade, business, industrial or professional secret, or any trade
process. However, in a decision of 1956 the Federal Department of Fi-
nance and Customs ruled that facts relating exclusively to tax offense (and
74See, for instance, form R 82 for the refund of Swiss tax withheld at source on dividends
and interest derived from Swiss sources, and form R US I for refund of, or credit for,
additional withholdings of tax on U.S. dividends or bond interest.751t is noteworthy that comprehensive analyses on tax treaties between the U.S. and
other countries than Switzerland, with similar "prevention of fraud" clauses, are practically
silent on the interpretation of this queer "appendix" to a convention for the avoidance of
double taxation. Compare, for instance, Chr6tien, 39 Revue de Science et de Legislation
Financieres, 415 (1947) on the 1939 and 1946 Treaties with France; Lazerow, 39 FORDHAM
L. REV. 649 (197 1) on the 1967 Treaty with France; Hermon Manning Wells, U.S. Policies in
International Double Taxation of Income, Thesis, Geneva 1950, at 206 et seq., and Carroll,
supra note 7 1, at 163.7 6Art. 1()(a).
77Art. 11(2).
78See Locher, vol. 2, art. XVI, No. 9. A circular issued by the Swiss Federal Council in
1951, deals with information "for the prevention and discovery of tax fraud cases."
Kreisschreiben No. 2 of November 30, 1951, § I1(3), Bundesblatt (Federal Gazette) 1951
11I, at 995.79The IRS could hence, in a fraud case, require information from Swiss tax authorities
with respect to a person not subject to U.S. taxation. See Locher, vol. 2, art. XVI, No. 7.
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not to a genuine secret), the non-disclosure of which would serve only to
escape prosecution, cannot be regarded as worthy of protection, and to
take precedence over the Treaty obligation to release such information.
Under a more lenient interpretation, any illegal act could be qualified as
a professional secret and make the application of Article XVI in tax fraud
cases ineffective.80 With respect to the cardinal question of whether, and to
what extent, banking secrecy could bar the exchange of information in
fraud cases, very little official authority is available. In 1955 the Swiss
Federal Tax Administration (hereinafter cited as "FTA") specified in a
letter to the IRS, that it cannot supply information referring to bank affairs,
because such an investigation is not possible under Swiss law.81 The FTA
suggested to the IRS that it secure the necessary certificates or information
directly from the taxpayer.82
Two years later the Federal Council rejected an appeal of a corporation,
against the decision of the FTA to furnish information to the IRS in a tax
fraud case.83 The object of the IRS request was an inquiry into the control
of a Swiss corporation, and its transactions with a United States company
and the shareholders thereof. The FTA investigated the case and reported
to the IRS the relevant facts, refusing however some information consid-
ered to be protected by banking secrecy. It cannot be derived from the
decision whether the furnished information was nevertheless regarded as
meeting the IRS needs.
2. RULING OF THE SWISS FEDERAL COURT OF 1970
On December 23, 1970 the Federal Court handed down a decision with
respect to Article XVI, which should shed some more light on its in-
terpretation. 4 The Court ruled basically that the FTA was by virtue of the
"fraud" clause entitled to supply the IRS with information consisting of
bank data on allegedly questionable dealings between a Swiss Bank and a
United States citizen. The importance of the decision requires that it be
closely examined.
The object of the judgment was an appeal by the U.S. citizen against an
order of the FTA to transmit to the IRS upon its request, a report
summarizing the result of the investigation that also contained data from
books and records of the bank involved. The appeal was primarily founded
8 Partly published in Locher, vol. 2, art. XVI, No. 8.
8 1Published in Locher, vol. 2, art. XVI, No. 4.82This suggestion makes sense under a tax law that threatens a non-complying taxpayer
with a presumptive assessment if he does not supply sufficient evidence.
s3Published in Locher, vol. 2, art. XVI, No. 14.84BGE 96 (1970) 1 737. Unofficial translations of the decision are published in CCH,
U.S. TAX CASES, 1971, No. 9435, and in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1029 (1971).
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on the contention that there was no basis under Swiss domestic law for the
investigation made at the bank, since no Swiss taxes were at stake and that,
in addition, banking secrecy would bar the furnishing of the intended
information.
The Court first reaffirmed the doctrine that under Swiss tax law third
parties-and that includes banks-may not be required to give information
on a taxpayer in assessment proceedings, and it pointed 6ut that this rule
applies equally to international administrative assistance in tax matters.8 5
However, the issue at bar was not the investigation of an assessment
measure, but a proceeding for tax fraud with respect to United States
taxes. Therefore the examination of the requirement for obtaining in-
formation in a proceeding of tax fraud affecting the United States Federal
income tax was necessary. The Court held that neither the text of the
clause nor the spirit and purpose of the Treaty, indicates intentions of the
two countries to limit the availability of information to cases where taxes
were simultaneously evaded in both countries. Hence, Switzerland would
not have to consider whether Swiss tax laws have been violated as
criterion for supplying information to the United States. 86
Of great importance then is the conclusion that available information
under the "fraud" clause, must be interpreted as meaning all information
that could be procured from banks under Swiss law, if the taxpayer had
defrauded Swiss tax authorities with respect to its income tax or, in more
general terms, each party to the Treaty must furnish some information that
it could obtain under domestic law if the situation were reversed.87
The decisive factor for applying the "fraud" clause is thus whether or
not a bank must, if the fraud had been committed under Swiss law, furnish
information to shed light on acts allegedly committed by a bank customer.
Since the Federal law does not contain any provisions on this subject, and
the cantonal tax laws give entirely different answers, the question
arises-and this is another basic issue-whether Switzerland has under-
taken a treaty obligation to exchange under the "fraud" clause, only that
information which could be obtained from banks under the applicable
cantonal law-if the situation were transposed accordingly-or whether
this country has agreed to establish an obligation under Federal law on the
part of the banks to supply information in certain cases. If Article XVI has
to be interpreted accordingly, this obligation would take priority over
divergent cantonal law, by the fact that a tax treaty becomes Swiss domes-
85BGE96 (1970) 1746.
86Loc. cit., at 746.87Loc. cit., at 746/747.
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tic law after its approval by the Federal Parliament and its ratification by
the Federal Council. 88
The text of the Treaty or its legislative history does not answer this
question and the Court tried to find its way by looking to the purpose of the
Treaty for its interpretation. It logically argued that if cantonal law were
used as a basis, the result would be that identical information would be
available or not available in Switzerland, depending on the applicable
cantonal law, and pointed to the possibility, in case of predominance of
cantonal rules, to shift fraudulent manipulations to banks located in "favor-
able" cantons. The Court then assumed that on the question of bank
information the attention of the United States must have been primarily
directed at the three important international banking centers: Zurich, Basel
and Geneva.89
In those cantons tax fraud is considered to be a criminal offense, and is
prosecuted in accordance with the provisions of the codes of criminal
procedure, which usually do not authorize the banker to refuse giving
evidence. Notwithstanding the fact that these procedural obligations are
directly based on the procedural law, the Court held that their actual basis
is nevertheless cantonal tax legislation, and the reference to the provisions
of the procedural codes constitutes merely a simplification from the view-
point of legal technique. 90
The Court proceeded then to its crucial and most arguable step of
interpretation, by assuming that the uniform pattern of rules in the three
major banking centers on the question of bank information in cases of tax
fraud, could have been interpreted by the United States Treaty negotiators
as an expression of the prevailing Swiss legal concept ("als Ausdruck der
herrschenden schweizerischen Rechtsauffassung"), and that they could
have, under given circumstances in good faith assumed that Switzerland
had agreed to include bank information in the "fraud" clause.91
It would be contrary to the meaning and purpose of the Treaty if
Switzerland would now insist on basing the criterion on the availability of
information on cantonal law. The Court thus established a competence
under Federal law to carry out investigations at banks in order to fulfill the
Treaty obligations in tax fraud cases. 92 The ruling also explicitly confirmed
that banking secrecy is professional secrecy.
8 8Transitional Provisions of the Federal Constitution, art. 2.
89BGE 96 (1970) 1 748.
9
°The availability of the information "under the respective taxation laws of the con-
tracting States" is required by art. XVI(l) of the Treaty (emphasis added).
91BGE 96 (1970) 1 750.92The Court left the question open as to whether facts determined with respect to such
investigations under the Treaty, rule could be used for domestic tax purposes.
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But with regard to the last sentence on Article XVI(l) according to
which information disclosing any trade, business, industrial or professional
secret or any trade process cannot be exchanged it held-again a bold
interpretation-that no independent importance can be attached to it for
the reasons already set forth. 93 The Court did not omit to emphasize,
however, that the Swiss banking secrecy is not abolished by virtue of
Article XVI, but can merely be lifted under very specific conditions. The
Swiss tax authorities are therefore required to examine carefully, the alle-
gation in a request for information in a tax fraud case before starting
inquiries at a bank. 94
The scope and possible future effects of the decision are difficult to
evaluate.95 The ruling fully covers the willingness of the FTA to provide
the IRS, in an apparently serious fraud case, with bank information and
thus sanctions, for the first time, a limitation on Swiss banking secrecy in
international tax relationships. But can it be interpreted as holding that
banking secrecy may always be lifted when a United States taxpayer
defrauded United States taxes, even, for instance, if the Swiss bank did not
take part in the fraud as happened in the case at bar'? It is doubtful that
Switzerland intended the Treaty to provide such far-reaching assistance
obligations.
A close examination of the decision raises at least as many questions as
it answers, and leaves serious doubts as to whether the issue on the fraud
clause is settled. One of the points to be questioned is the judicial assump-
tion that the uniform availability of bank information in criminal proceed-
ings at three main banking centers could have been interpreted by the
United States Treaty negotiators as prevailing Swiss legal opinion. Such
reasoning sounds artificial and not convincing. Swiss federalism in the area
of taxation and legislation is so notorious, that it can be expected to be
known to tax treaty experts as a nation with unlimited sources of in-
telligence, and even if not, such knowledge would have been easily obtain-
able.
The argument that shady transactions could otherwise be shifted to
cantons where banks are not required to furnish information, is an objec-
tion equally valid for Swiss domestic transactions and is nothing more than
93BGE 96 (1970) 1 752.94The request for assistance must credibly justify the necessity of an investigation for tax
fraud ("glaubhaft die Notwendigkeit einer Untersuchung auf Steuerbetrug begruenden"), loc.
cit., at 75 I.95For comments in the United States (with an unmistakable tendency to give the effect of
the ruling an "overshooting" importance) see Swiss Bank Accounts Not Immune From IRS,
34 J. OF TAXATION, 293 (1971); Steptoe, The "Secret" Swiss Account: End of An Era, 38
BROOKLYN L. REV. 383 (1971).
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one of the prices to be paid for a federalistic system.9r 6 The interpretation
given in the ruling puts the IRS with respect to the availability of tax
information in fraud cases in a better position than many cantonal tax
authorities-an absurd result, that could never have been intended by
Switzerland when negotiating the Treaty.
Another unsolved main issue is the question of the usefulness of bank
information to the United States as supplied by virtue of a tax treaty. Tax
information exchanged between the revenue services of two countries are
usually furnished in the form of a confidential official report (Amtsbericht).
Such reports merely serve informative purposes, and are hence not docu-
mented with original records or other items of evidence. This area of
international administrative assistance, as provided in tax treaties, must be
clearly distinguished from international judicial assistance as applied in
treaties on mutual assistance in criminal matters.
An agreement on judicial assistance requires numerous detailed proce-
dural provisions, dealing with questions as to giving testimony, availability
of documents, execution of letters rogatory, personal appearance, etc. A
treaty for the avoidance of double taxation has a completely different
objective and cannot be a suitable tool to cover this complex field of
international assistance.9 7 But if tax information as supplied by a treaty
partner cannot be effectively used in court proceedings in the United
States, with its rigid rules for due process, the usefulness of a "fraud"
provision becomes fairly limited, and its effectiveness questionable.
B. Unilateral Measures of the United States
Because of the virtual impossibility of efficiently curbing the use of
foreign bank facilities for tax evasion, and other illegal purposes at the
96The pros and cons of Swiss federalism (a term applied in Switzerland to emphasize a
tendency to preserve the individuality of political subdivisions, hence, with an exactly oppo-
site meaning from that used in the United States) should, of course, not be evaluated only
under the narrow viewpoint of taxation. The federal structure, historically grown during
centuries, is-with all its bearable shortcomings-still widely held as the very "lifeblood" of a
lively democracy, and as a keystone for good relations between, and protection of, different
linguistic and cultural population groups. It is clear that the postulate of an "ideal" tax system
has to be subdued to the more vital socio-political aspects of the country's structure. The
United States position with respect to the Swiss way of handling tax offenses at the H.R.
1969/1970 Hearings (see infra note 107, at 8 1), that these "policies may have been necessary
100 years ago or 50 years ago, but now Switzerland is in the modern era" appears for these
(and other) reasons rather out of place.97That no judicial assistance can be read into art. XVI may also be concluded from its
text. Whereas most U.S. tax treaties contain the standard formula that exchanged information
may be disclosed only "to persons (including a court or administrative body) concerned with
assessment, collection, enforcement, or prosecution with respect to taxes," the Swiss-U.S.
Tax Treaty is much more restrictive by prohibiting the disclosure of information "to any
person other than those concerned with the assessment and collection of taxes." It cannot be
assumed that the prosecuting and judicial bodies have not been deliberately omitted as
recipients of tax information.
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international level, the United States has launched a unilateral program for
obtaining more information on foreign accounts and transactions in various
areas.
A first measure deals with the disclosure of foreign bank accounts. Each
United States taxpayer is, with respect to taxable years beginning on or
after January 1970, required to disclose his interest at any time during the
taxable year in foreign bank, brokerage, and similar accounts on his tax
return.9 8 The question appears to be based on the general authorization of
the IRS, to require information from all persons subject to United States
tax. 9a An affirmative answer requires the filing of an additional form,
specifying the type of interest and other relevant details, with the return.
This approach of obtaining bank information directly from the taxpayer,
looks like a variation on the Swiss approach, but differs in its method of
applying pressure on non-complying taxpayers. The Swiss tax authorities
usually require in suspicious cases the production of bank records or, if
refused, the payment of taxes on the basis of an assumed income; the
United States system puts the deterrent effect on penal and forfeiture
sanctions.
Another area of counter-measures is covered by "The Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act" (also known as the "Secret Foreign
Bank Accounts Act"), as enacted on October 26, 1970.101 This legislation
aims at "frustrating organized and white collar criminal elements who use
secret foreign accounts" in connection with tax evasion and drug, gam-
bling, securities and currency violations,10 ' and provides for certain report-
ing or record keeping "where such reports or records have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.' 0 2
Obtaining records by established discovery procedures from banks and
other institutions, in connection with the examination of a particular tax-
payer's returns, apparently does not infringe his right of privacy under
United States legal concepts. To proceed a step further, and survey such
records regularly, would certainly open immense possibilities to the IRS, in
tracking foreign dealings and would provide leads to tax evasion cases. It is
"
8The question on form 1040 reads: "Did you, at any time during the taxable year, have
any interest in or signature or other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial
account in a foreign country (except in a U.S. military banking facility operated by a U.S.
financial institution)?"
991RC, § 601 1(a).See also 37 Fed. Reg. 6913 (1972) § 103.24.100Pub. L. 91-508 (84 Stat. 1114 et seq.) (hereinafter cited as "1970 Act"). For com-
ments on the 1970 Act see, Thomason, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEXAS INT'L L.
FORUM 105 (1970);Secret Swiss Bank Accounts: Uses, Abuses, and Attempts at Control, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 500 (1970- 1971); Steptoe, supra note 95, at 303; Seltzer, New rules, 34 J.
OF TAXATION 292 (197 1).
1
"Statement of Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., Treasury General Counsel, Wall Street Journal,
March 31, 1972, at 3.
1021970 Act, § 202.
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questionable, however, whether the advantages of such broad authority
would outweigh possible adverse effects on legitimate business transac-
tions.103
The regulations implementing the provisions of titles I and 11 of the
1970 Act 0 4 basically require individuals who physically take more than
$5,000 in cash, foreign currency, travelers' checks, money orders or bear-
er-form negotiable securities out of the country or arrive in the United
States with such a sum to report it to the customs officer on the spot. If the
monetary instrument is mailed or otherwise transported separately, the
report must be filed by mail with the Commissioner of Customs.
Further, each person having financial interests in a foreign bank account
is required to keep records of all tax-relevant aspects of the account for
five years. Banks and financial institutions have to report currency transac-
tions-domestic or foreign-of more than $10,000 each (except in a few
specified cases), and must keep records of all transfers of more than
$10,000 into or out of the United States, They must retain such records for
two years (in some cases for five years) so that the authorities may
reconstruct the transactions in such account. Unreported transactions may
result in civil or criminal penalties and confiscation of the currency moved
in violation of the reporting provisions.
The enforcement of such rules naturally poses problems, but there is no
doubt that the measures will have a certain deterrent effect on illegal
money transfers. The approach chosen by the United States also saves the
legislator from having to single out specific nations whose banking system
appears to be particularly attractive to United States persons. Thus, the
risk of substituting one country's financial facilities for those of many
others available to prospective tax evaders is reduced. The 1970 Act might
serve as a model for other countries facing similar problems.
VI. Proposed Treaty Between Switzerland and the
United States on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
The beginning of the Swiss-United States cooperation in the field of
mutual assistance in criminal matters goes back as far as the last century.
1 31t is interesting to note that in the United States new voices claim that one of the
"problems inherent in this type of legislation, is that it jeopardizes banking 'privacy' which
also exists in the United States," and that any investigation under the 1970 Act therefore be
restricted to the bank records of those suspected of a crime. See L.A.R., supra note 68, at
103. 104The application of the rules has been delayed by objections raised with respect to a
first set of regulations, set forth in tentative form by the U.S. Department of Treasury on June
10, 1971 (36 Fed. Reg. 11208 (1971)). U.S. banks are apparently not enthusiastic about the
rules; see New York Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 37. The somewhat eased final version of the
regulations becomes effective July I, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 6912 (1972).
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In 1900 a Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals was concluded.'", This
bilateral relationship was supplemented by cooperation on an ad hoc basis
and accession by both countries to a number of multilateral agreements
designed to combat typical international crimes.
The main reason that no bilateral treaty on judicial assistance came into
existence for so many decades, must certainly be linked to the great
difficulties of reconciling particulars of the Anglo-American procedural law
with the Continental European pattern of criminal proceedings. It appears
that the conclusion of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters in 1959106 has initiated a change in the United States
attitude toward considering a treaty concept, that would also fit into the
European procedural system. Another impetus to approach Switzerland for
the conclusion of an assistance treaty is probably linked with the problems
arising in the United States with regard to the shifting of illegally acquired
moneys to foreign countries. The public discussion on this topic culminated
at the Hearings before the Committees on Banking and Currency of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in 1968 to 1970."'7
The confidential course of the negotiations has hitherto prevented the
release of substantive information on the scope of the prospective agree-
ment. There is no doubt that the reconciling of fundamental differences in
the fiscal and legal concepts of the two countries, poses major obstacles for
a speedy preparation of a draft. With a view to the non-availability of
banking information to the Swiss tax authorities themselves, it can safely
be predicted that the treaty will, on principle, not be applicable to in-
vestigations or proceedings concerning violations of tax laws. Tax offenses
would also have to be excluded on the ground that the exchange of
information and granting of assistance in tax fraud cases is exhaustively
regulated by the Tax Treaty.
But this principle will presumably suffer one significant exception.
Unofficial reports indicate that judicial assistance might, under specified
circumstances, be extended to tax offenses of persons who belong to
organized crime.x08 It is reported that assistance would be granted only on
1 5 BS 12, at 267; T.S. No. 354.
1,6472 U.N.T.S. 186.
"°"Hearings beJbre the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., on S. 3678 and H.R. 15073,
Washington, 1970: Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of
Representatives, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., on Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign Banking
Procedures on the United States, Washington, 1968: Hearings before the Committee on
Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 91st Cong. Ist and 2d Sess., on H.R.
15073, Washington, 1970 (hereinafter cited as "H.R. 1969/1970 Hearings").
'
08Compare New York Times, Aug. 18, 1970, at I and 8; Tax News Service, Aug. 3 1,
1970, pt. II, at 53; European Taxation, Sept. 1970, pt. II, at 128: Secret Swiss Bank
Accounts: Uses, Abuses, and Attempts at Control, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 508 (1970-1971);
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 12, 1972, at 61.
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grounds of reasonable suspicion that the alleged crime has been committed
by upper echelon members of a criminal group of persons (other than mere
gangs) who were actively engaged in obtaining significant influence in
commerce or politics for a substantial period of time and, in addition, if it
can be concluded reasonably that the requested assistance would result in
the imprisonment of such persons for a longer period of time' 9 Such a
proceeding would obviously supersede banking secrecy. If the final draft of
the proposed treaty takes that direction, the United States may claim to
have reached one of its main policy aims in its campaign against Swiss
banking secrecy.
The United States characterizes organized crime as "a totalitarian and
closed society operating within an open and democratic one," and as a
threat that cannot be ignored or tolerated any longer. 110 Some go even
further, and claim that its impact has become a worldwide problem."1
Unique features of organized crime are its dedication to illegality as a
continuing enterprise, its reach of all profitable areas of criminality and a
great flexibility on changes of economic or legal conditions."l 2 The social
and political dangers of organized criminality are certainly eminent.
Particularly demoralizing is the fact that responsible leaders, not directly
involved in the committing of common crimes, apparently very often suc-
ceed in escaping criminal prosecution. Loopholes in the laws, shortcomings
in law enforcement, and a wide net of corruption are regularly cited as
reasons for this degree of immunity from legal accountability. 113
Thus the only way to punish top people of criminal groups is often
prosecution for tax offenses. There is no doubt that the upper echelon of
organized crime also takes advantage of international finance transactions
to harbor the fruits of their crimes outside the United States. International
assistance to locate such funds would be one among the various desirable
weapons for the difficult fight against this devastating form of lawlessness.
The inclusion of provisions concerning organized crime in a judicial
assistance treaty poses very difficult definitional problems, particularly in
view of the fact that not even United States domestic law allows the truly
509Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Aug. 23, 1970, at 17.
110MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO THE FIGHT
AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME, April 23, 1969, H.R. Doc. No. 91- 105, at 2.
1 11H.R. 1969/1970 Hearings, at 15.
1l2Compare Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime: Highlighting the Challenging New
Frontiers in Criminal Law, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41 (1970).113See particularly the shocking report of Senator McClellan, The Organized Crime Act
(S.30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties? 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970). See
also Presidential Message, supra note 110. The statement at the HR. 1969/1970 Hearings
"that the tax evasion problem is the most serious aspect of these hearings, even more than the
use of these secret foreign accounts by the organized underworld" (at 56) is in view of the
described realities uncomprehensible.
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responsible to be brought to trial. Besides this specific area many other
thorny questions arising from the different legal concepts of the two coun-
tries must be solved. Serious problems include the extreme formalism and
the rigid exclusionary rules of the United States procedural law. The rules
for due process, finding its ultimate rationale in the system of trial by jury,
do not easily fit into a bilateral agreement with a civil law country where
judges have a far wider discretion in evaluating facts and evidence. 114
Such discrepancies take particularly vexing dimensions if they become
interrelated with other conflicting legal approaches of the two countries.
Thus Swiss law protects the individual's privacy to a much greater extent
than United States legislation. Also on the procedural side various restric-
tions exist.115 It is obvious that such rights may not be basically curtailed
in international assistance proceedings. A particularly careful weighing of
interests will be necessary in cases in which the disclosure of facts affects
persons who are not connected in any way to the offense which is the basis
for an assistance request. 116
Another 'pibce de r6sistance' for mutual assistance might be the
so-called doctrine of limitation on use of obtained information (Prinzip der
Spezialitaet) as applied under Swiss law.117 This rule means that in-
formation may not be used in any proceeding relating to an offense other
than that for which assistance has been granted. Conflicts could then
emerge when the crime for which assistance is obtained also involves a
violation of tax laws (the falsification of a document may, for instance, be
connected with tax evasion). Obtained assistance may not be used for the
prosecution of a fiscal offense.
Conversely, information supplied under a tax treaty must not be brought
into an investigation in proceedings for common crimes." 8 This doctrine is
hardly compatible with the United States procedural concept under which
any item of evidence is considered as a matter of public record. Other
procedural questions to be cast into the framework of the two legal con-
114Thus both the rule against opinion, inference or inclusion, and the rule against hearsay
would require in assistance proceedings, that original records or documents be presented to
the U.S. authorities. An official report with all the necessary information furnished by the
authorities of the requested country, would apparently be of little value in a U.S. trial.
1 15See Meyer, Obtaining Evidence in Switzerland for Use in Foreign Courts, 3 AM. J.
COMP. L. 412 (1954); Miller, International Cooperation in Litigation Between the United
States and Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Accommodation in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L.
REV. 1069 (1965).
1161f the proposed treaty should provide for the furnishing of documentary evidence to
the requesting country, this delicate question would particularly arise when imparting banking
information in form of ledger sheets.117Verwaltungsentscheide der Bundesbehoeden (Administrative Decisions of Federal
Authorities) 1957, No. 3.
11 The doctrine is also embodied in the OECD Draft Convention, art. 26(l).
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cepts, concern rules on personal appearance for testimony in the requesting
country, the interviewing of persons in the requested country by represen-
tatives of the requesting side, the authentication of documents and many
related items of assistance proceedings.1 19
If the prospective treaty comes into effect with provisions on the avail-
ability of fiscal and banking information in cases concerning organized
crime, it may certainly be regarded as a significant step forward in the
international combat against dangerous forms of crime.1 2 But the ex-
ception with respect to organized crime could hardly be interpreted as a
departure from the traditional Swiss approach in the area of tax and
banking information. Assistance would only be granted for the purpose of
bringing leaders of criminal groups to trial, and the roundabout over tax
offenses has to be regarded as a mere tactical device.
There should also not arise the illusion that Switzerland's share to that
end, will become a decisive factor in curbing the organized underworld. 'La
Cosa Nostra' commits much more abominable crimes than tax evasion,
and other escape routes to shelter moneys are available. Again, it should be
taken into consideration that the main attack can only be mounted on legal
loopholes and other shortcomings within the nation where such demoraliz-
ing operations can be run without seriously risking having to account
legally for them.
VII. Concluding Observations
This study does not attempt to pass judgment on values and demerits of
banking secrecy, or to make futile guesses on its real impact on in-
ternational tax morale. The area is very comprehensive and has manifold
economic, legal and political implications. Existence of secrecy in banking
affairs is, in Switzerland and in numerous other countries, to varying
degrees, a matter of fact,121 and must be faced in some way. A few
summarizing remarks focus on some crucial points and should recall some
aspects that are often neglected when outlining one or the other sector of
the problem.
11 9The necessity of agreeing on a large set of partly complex procedural rules, may be
regarded as another conclusive argument that a brief information clause in a tax treaty such as
art. XVI of the Swiss -U.S. Tax Treaty, cannot be interpreted as an obligation to provide
judicial assistance. Exchange of information under a tax treaty is confined to purely adminis-
trative assistance, and thus excludes the servicing of evidentiary items such as original
documents.
12"The discussed agreement would knowingly be the first comprehensive mutual assis-
tance treaty in criminal matters, between the United States and a civil law country.
121 1n 1970, banking accounts could be kept secret from foreign investigations in 27
countries, 163 N.Y. L.J.41 at 1 (1970).
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Under domestic taxation, Swiss banking secrecy clearly does not offer a
refuge to tax evaders or persons involved in crime. A well-balanced ap-
proach, not artificially imposed but grown through a long legislative his-
tory, allows the maintenance of privacy in money matters to a reasonable
extent without providing tax escape routes. The approach provided by
Swiss law (in particular in the tax area), to keep banking secrecy within its
legitimate purposes, cannot be simply overlooked when considering its
broader implications and possible remedies.
Internationally, banking secrecy poses obviously more onerous prob-
lems. Not too long ago, widely applauded as a virtue, change of times and a
pragmatic approach now cause many to condemn the extensive legal pro-
tection of the bank depositor against unveiling data in favor of foreign
governments as a vice of Switzerland's legal system. Even leaving out of
consideration the basic concepts of Swiss banking secrecy, deeply im-
bedded in the country's legal system and "tout imprgn~e de juridisme et
de moralisme",1 22 it cannot be reasonably expected that a country fur-
nishes confidential information to foreign revenue services, which is not
obtainable to its own tax authorities.
Neither is it conceivable to abandon by a stroke of the pen, a tax system,
integrated into a federalistic structure, that relies basically on information
given by the taxpayer. As is well known, in Switzerland changes in the law
need the consensus of the electorate, and public opinion would hardly be
prepared to give the green light to such a drastic step. Currently, it is highly
questionable whether the curtailing of Switzerland's banking secrecy,
would bring any sensible relief to problems of tax evasion of other coun-
tries. Exchange-of-information clauses in tax treaties still have, even with-
out secrecy in banking affairs, a very limited scope.
The numerous nations maintaining secrecy-some of them with a much
tighter veil12 3-would willingly substitute for the one loophole allegedly
already plugged. A worldwide harmonization of the secrecy concept, prob-
ably belongs for the foreseeable future, to the realm of wishful thinking.
And it is a sad truth to remember that even without banking secrecy, our
imperfect world would still offer a wide field to sophisticated tax evaders.
The present survey also shows that Switzerland does not flatly refuse
international cooperation in the area under discussion, where the
law-enforcement problems really outgrow a country's possibilities, and
where the degree of lawlessness emerges as a danger of international
122Vasseur, in the preface to Raymond Farhat, Le Secret Bancaire, Etude de Droit
Compare (France, Suisse, Liban), Paris 1970, at I 1l.
123The assumption that the use of such banking accounts has not-or not
yet-outmatched that of Swiss banks must probably be linked, besides the latter's reputation,
with the belief, right or wrong, that Switzerland's political and economic stability remains
eternally unshakable.
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concern such as organized crime. Unilaterally, in the 1970 amendment to
the Banking Law, Switzerland strengthened the requirements with respect
to the establishment of new banks (there is some belief that for-
eign-controlled banks have been less hesitant in engaging in questionable
transactions).
Further, a sound self-interest should induce banks to observe a defen-
sible standard of banking ethics, 124 and to exercise an alert self-restraint
vis-.-vis investors with assets of doubtful origin. The prosperity of the
Swiss banks does not depend on dubious dealings which, in the long run,
would not only damage their reputation, but could also generate adverse
effects on the nation as a whole. The large majority of Swiss bankers are
doubtlessly aware of their great responsibility in this area.
A realistic analysis of the underlying problems and facts should suggest
that tax evasion and money-related crime, must primarily be combatted in
the affected country itself. No nation modifies its law and tax system on the
grounds of mere convenience to a foreign government, even with full
awareness of today's international interdependence in economic, political
and social affairs. The "do ut des" plays in no other area of international
law a more significant role, than in international fiscal relationships-the
treasures still belong to the best defended national fortresses.
Even if the possibility should not be ruled out that multilateral agree-
ments might ease the problem of international tax evasion at some future
date, the practical and doctrinal obstacles to bring all nations in this area
under one umbrella can hardly be over-estimated. And not all countries
have hitherto seriously attempted to do their homework in dealing with tax
evasion and related problems.
The claim for international assistance and for compliance of other na-
tions with one's own requests loses much of its credibility, if domestic
measures in this field lack the necessary vigor or are handicapped by
factors that are in no way related to banking secrecy. 125 The hardly dis-
putable argument that the issue is, with regard to the United States,
"essentially an American problem which should, in the last analysis, be
solved by Americans,' ' 1 26 has therefore, to some extent at least, global
validity.
124The Swiss Bankers' Association issued guidelines in 1968 to that end, with particular
emphasis to observe U.S. regulations.125Thus, in view of the long-existing penetration of organized crime in American life (as
referred to in the Presidential Message of 1969), it is difficult for an outsider to understand
why the relevant U.S. laws, and the law enforcement machinery, have not been adapted to the
situation in a way that would have dealt a striking blow to organized crime conspiracy, thus
making cumbersome international efforts to locate illegally acquired funds abroad less com-
pelling.126L.A.R., supra note 68, at 106. See also Swiss Bank Accounts, supra note 100, at 500.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
